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Abstract
From the mid-60s to the mid-80s there has been a gradual but fundamental change
in the nature of trade protection. International trade has become increasingly restricted
by quotas and other nontariﬀ barriers, as the level of tariﬀs have fallen and governments
have devised other forms of protection for sectors facing increased foreign competition.
The paper shows such non-tariﬀ barriers have very diﬀerent eﬀects and implications
from tariﬀ for the welfare outcome of a regional integration agreement. Indeed, binding
quotas, diﬀerently from tariﬀs, succeed to preserve the trade volumes with the rest of
the world, and lead to welfare improving customs unions and free trade areas since trade
between the partners is not expanded at the expense of trade with the outside world.
By relating the existence of welfare enhancing regional integration to the systematic
change in the type of trade policy conducted by most countries, this paper emphasizes
that the desirability of piecemeal reforms has increased through time and justiﬁes a
renewed and grown policy interest in preferential trade in the 90s, when NTBs had a
greater weight in trade policies. This can contribute to explain the spurt of regionalism
observed in the data.
∗ I am indebted to Prof. Staiger Robert for his useful suggestions and comments. I also would like to thank
Prof. Omar Licandro, Prof. Morten Ravn, Philip Sauré and all other participants to the seminar at EUI.
All mistakes are mine.
∗ Author’s corresponding address is davide.sala@iue.itRTAs formation and trade policy
1 Introduction
Starting from the 90s, regional integration has experienced a spurt and it has represented a
major feature of International Relations. Starting in 1948, some 200 RIAs have been notiﬁed
to GATT/WTO, but about one-half of all notiﬁcations have occurred in the last decade.
This recent proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) was often attributed to
the unsatisfactory progress of multilateral trade negotiations and therefore, to issues related
to the eﬃciency of multilateral trade liberalization to achieve free trade.1 This view has
shifted the economic debate from the traditional concern about the welfare implications
of preferential trade per se, to the highly controversial issue on whether regionalism or
multilateralism is the most eﬀective strategy for achieving global free trade.2
A common feature of this literature is that trade policy has been represented mostly
by tariﬀ measures and their reductions, mirroring probably that the major eﬀort of GATT
rounds was the reduction of tariﬀ barriers.3
However, this at odd with the striking empirical observation that numerous other in-
1 See for example Bhagwati (1993). The ﬁrst wave of regionalism took place in the 1960s, but it failed to
spread because the U.S. supported a multilateral approach. But the U.S. changed positions, and — starting
with the 1980s — has favored regional trade agreements. See also Fernandez (1997) for a broad and extensive
review on the "traditional" and "non-traditional" gains of regionalism .
2 Some view PTAs as antithetical to the GATT, inevitably leading to a world of warring trade blocs -
stumbling blocs in Bhagwati’s deﬁnition - while others view them as supplemental, being just one more path
by which global free trade can be approached - building blocs. See Summers (1991), Krugman (1993) and
Frankel et. al (1997). For a traditional approach to custom unions (CUs) focusing on its welfare outcome,
refer to Viner (1950).
3 In this literature, alternative measures to tariﬀ protection such as quota restrictions have been analyzed
in terms of their tariﬀ-equivalent. Note that uniform tariﬀ measures are also analytically convenient.
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struments of trade policy - such as global and country speciﬁc volume quotas, value quotas,
v o l u n t a r ye x p o r tr e s t r a i n t( V E R ) ,l o c a lc o n t e n ts c h e m e s-h a v eb e c o m em o r ea n dm o r ep o p -
ular throughout out all countries. The relevance of this is that Corden and Falvey (1985) and
Falvey (1988) have shown that these instruments have speciﬁc implications - not shared with
tariﬀs - in the context of piecemeal tariﬀ reform which are likely to be relevant for regional
integration too, but have not been - to the best of my knowledge - explored so far. Going
back to a more traditional welfare approach, the aim of this paper is to show that, diﬀerently
from tariﬀs, such non tariﬀ barriers have positive implications for the welfare consequence
of a regional integration agreement.
Starting from this standpoint, this paper relates the policy interest in preferential trade
among nations to a well known feature of international trade relations - the gradual but
fundamental change in the nature of trade protection over the past thirty years. As inter-
national negotiation has succeeded in reducing tariﬀs to low levels, national governments
have resorted to a range of increasingly intricate policies to protect their domestic industries
from foreign competition. As Laird and Yeats (1990) note "while a major eﬀort was made
in multilateral trade negotiations to reduce tariﬀs, protectionism in the form of NTBs (non
tariﬀ barriers) greatly expanded, and may have even oﬀset or exceeded the eﬀects of liberalized
import duties". Estimates relating to the post WWII period indicate that the average tariﬀ
on manufactures in developed countries was approximately 40 percent, whereas nowadays it
is lower than 5 percent. The declining proportion of imported industrial products that do
not receive duty free treatment in developed countries, and the reduced fraction of imports
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into developed countries from all sources facing tariﬀ rates more than 15%, point to the same
evidence of falling tariﬀs protection over the same period. On the contrary, in 1966 NTBs
aﬀected 25 per cent of developed countries’ imports, while in 1986 this share had increased
to 48 percent, a symptom of an increasing trend of non-tariﬀ trade restrictions.
In spite of GATT prohibitions, these quantitative restriction have been widely used,
partly because GATT rules do permit countries to recourse to instruments such as quota
to protect domestic agriculture as anti-dumping measures and as temporary "safeguard"
actions. Moreover, most developing economies are exonerated from these rules and trade
in textile and apparel and agriculture commodities has been largely exempted from GATT
disciplines for decades. In addition, VER, being voluntary, are negotiated on a bilateral
basis outside the GATT framework.4 The consequence being that such direct quantitative
restrictions (QRs) on international trade have greatly expanded their coverage: from $ 30
billion of imports from OECD countries aﬀected by NTBs in 1966 ($ 100 billion in 1986
prices) to the $356 billion of 1986.
In the context of regional integration (RI), non tariﬀ barriers have diﬀerent implications
from tariﬀso nt r a d eﬂows and therefore, they lead to a diﬀerent welfare outcome. Prior to a
regional agreement, it may be presumed that a country had the same tariﬀs on all countries,
but it purchased from outside the union because that price was lowest. After the union, the
4 For instance, The Long-Term Textile Agreement (LTA) and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) are a
series of bilateral trade quotas covering textiles and apparel that have been negotiated outside the GATT.
Many countries have kept their programs of support for agricultural apart from GATT rules. The USA,
for example, have being using import quotas to support domestic farm price, and similarly the European
Community supports its farmers with its Common Agricultural Policy which relies on a series of variable
tariﬀs that act very much like quotas.
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country switches its purchases from the lowest-price to a higher-price country. However, if
imports had been limited by volume quotas, a member-country could still have imported the
good from the lowest cost supplier, as long as the quantity of imports did not exceed the
quota limits. Trade diversion occurs at a less extent under quota restricted trade than under
tariﬀ-restricted trade. In particular, if quotas vis-á-vis countries outside the union result
binding even after the implementation of a RTA, the volumes of trade with the rest of the
world will be clearly preserved - which is the "eﬃcient rule" for welfare-enhancing custom
unions and FTAs as proposed by Kemp and Wan (1976) and Krishna and Panagariya (2002).
In other words, the Kemp-Wan and Krishna-Panagariya results have important implications
in the presence of QRs. This is the main result of the paper and suggests welfare gains from
a trade agreement may turn to be more likely under NTBs than under tariﬀ-barriers. In
turn, this may have led government to a renewed policy interest in the formation of RTAs
after 1990.
The intuition for this result is simple: binding quotas, diﬀerently from tariﬀs, succeed to
preserve the trade volumes with the rest of the world. When purchases from the rest of the
world are ﬁxed, countries in a CU and in a FTA move closer to free trade which is welfare
improvement. Indeed, in this speciﬁc case the FTA does not reduce trade with the outside
world and expands trade between the partners.
Krishna and Panagariya (2002) do not provide a general existence result for a tariﬀ vector
ensuring that the criterion they propose for welfare enhancing FTA holds - namely, every
FTA member imports and exports the same quantity with the rest of the world as they did
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before the FTA. This paper shows that the presence of binding NTBs vis-à-vis non member
countries leads to a FTA formation that naturally implements this "eﬃciency rule", whereas
the same agreement implemented in presence of tariﬀ restricted trade could not lead to such
outcome. The intuition for the latter result is related to Bagwell and Staiger (2004) who
shows that any bilateral agreement on tariﬀ-reduction can preserve the pre-existing volumes
of trade if only satisﬁes the principles of reciprocity and Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
treatment, which is necessarily violated by a FTA.5
Furthermore, Kemp and Wan (1976) and Krishna and Panagariya (2002) allow us to
conclude that welfare improving CUs and FTAs exist, while this paper emphasizes that the
desirability of such reforms has increased through time, by relating the existence of welfare
enhancing FTAs to the systematic change in the type of trade policy instruments adopted by
most countries over the past twenty-ﬁve years. As countries have reduced tariﬀ protection in
the fulﬁlment of GATT regulations and substitute it with non-tariﬀ trade restrictions, policy
maker’s interest for joining into a RTAs has also increased, resulting in a greater formation
of RTAs.
Chang and Winters (2002) have shown that Mercosur has brought signiﬁcant terms of
trade appreciation for Brazil and loss for the external countries exporting into the area,
including US, Japan, Germany, South Korea and Chile. Interestingly, the model shows that
5 This principle states that all countries belonging to GATT should be treated equally. So if Japan reduces
its tariﬀs on goods coming from Europe, it must do the same for those goods coming from any other member
country of GATT.
Under the principle of reciprocity, negotiations result in tariﬀ adjustments that generate for each par-
ticipant an equal change in the volume of its imports and exports.
5RTAs formation and trade policy
such eﬀects could be driven by agreements upon the abolition of existing VERs (possibly
arising also in the context of regional integration) and that such agreements may turn to
be welfare-enhancing. This is especially important, given the extensive use of VERs in the
mid-80s for which later on countries have rescinded their requests in the 90s.6
Finally, in their survey De Melo et. al. (1993), they brieﬂy discuss the possibility of a
welfare improving FTA in presence of QRs, but their underline assumption is that partner
countries are small relative to the rest of the world. I consider the large country setting, but
like them, I assess the beneﬁts of RI from the view point of participating countries rather
than the world as a whole.
The basic insights are developed in a three-countries, two-goods general equilibrium trade
model presented in section 2. I shall follow closely Bagwell and Staiger (1999), (2002) and
(2004), and extend their framework to include global quotas, country-speciﬁc quotas and
VERs besides tariﬀs, as instruments of trade policy available to countries. Then, the model
is used in section 3 to analyze the diﬀerent welfare consequence of a RTA in presence of
quota-restricted from tariﬀ-restricted trade. The small open economy case is illustrative of
the diﬀerent adjustment mechanisms implied by NTBs and tariﬀs after the implementation
of an agreement. Such mechanisms will still be operative in the large economy case, but they
will be either reinforced or oﬀset by terms of trade eﬀects. Given the empirical relevance of
VERs, section 4 shows that they can also lead to a favorable welfare outcome of regionalism
in spite of the terms of trade eﬀects induced. In section (5), I turn to the possibility of
6 For example Laird and Yeat (1990) have documented that the incidence of VERs on import volumes has
greatly increased between 1981 and 1986 for all developed economies.
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comparing the gains arising from RIAs under two diﬀerent trade policies, namely quotas and
tariﬀs. The last section concludes.
2 The model
The basic insights for the diﬀerent outcome of regional integration in presence of two diﬀerent
instruments of trade policy - namely tariﬀs and volume quota restrictions - can be developed
in a three country {A,B,C}, two goods {x,y} general equilibrium model.7 All countries
share the same preferences over x,y which are normal goods in consumption and are produced
in each country with a non-increasing return to scale technology. All markets are perfectly
competitive.
Trade-Patterns
Trade patterns reﬂect comparative advantages: without loss of generality, country A
(home country- no *) exports good y to foreign countries ∗B and ∗C and imports good x
from them. For simplicity, suppose further that the two foreign countries do not trade with
one another8. This is the easiest and minimal structure to confront, in the next section, the
home country with the option of a trade agreement with ∗B (e.g. a FTA) when trade is
restricted either by NTBs or by tariﬀ measures.
Trade Policy
The trade policy conducted by each country is exogenously given, as its political deter-
7 This model is developed in greater detail in Bagwell and Staiger (1999), (2002) and (2004).
8 This is the simplest way to ensure A can set a discriminatory trade policy (e.g. a trade agreement) against
its two foreign trading partners without prohibiting trade with the less favored partner.
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mination is beyond the aim of the present paper. Among several types of NTBs, direct
quantitative restrictions on international trade have become particularly widespread. Thus,
I shall restrict my attention here to volume import quotas and VERs. The volume quota
imposed by the home country on imports of x from foreign country i is denoted as mi,a n d
m∗i is likewise the quantity restriction imposed by foreign country i on imports of good y.
Note that, more broadly, mi may be re-interpreted as the VER imposed (possibly on request
or threat) by foreign country i to A,a n dl i k e w i s e ,m∗i m a yb et h eV E Rl e v i e db yAa g a i n s t
foreign country i.
When trade protection is achieved through tariﬀs, the ad valorem tariﬀ that the home
government places on imports of x from foreign country i is denoted as ti,a n dt∗i likewise
denotes the ad valorem tariﬀ levied by the government of foreign country i on imports of y
f r o mt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .W h e ntB = tC, A is implementing a non-discriminatory trade policy
complying with the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of GATT. On the other hand,
tB 6= tC is a descriminatory trade policy. Note that t (t∗i) can also the implicit trade tax
associated with a quantitative restriction mi (m∗i).
Assume that the revenue collected by each country from trade protection is disbursed to
the consumers by costless non-distortionary means. Throughout, I shall assume the market
for import quota licenses is competitive. That is, quota are allocated so as to ensure perfect
competition among quota holders.9
9 This assumption ensures that in equilibrium there will no be unexploited proﬁt opportunities so that each
quota-license holder uses entirely its license.
Moreover, as Krueger (1974) notes quota-induced scarcity rents are economically valuable and may push
some ﬁrms to engage in some "rent seeking" activities such as lobbying, red-tape, and other resource-using
activities. I disregard this possibility here and assume that there is no diversion of economic resources from
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International Transaction, and Terms of Trade
Let p ≡ px/py denotes A’s local relative price and similarly p∗i = p∗i
x /p∗i
y , the local
relative price in foreign country i. Letting τi ≡ (1 + ti) and τ∗i =( 1+t∗i),t h el o c a l
prices can be represented in terms of world prices and tariﬀsb yp = τipwi ≡ p(τi,p wi)
and p∗i = pwi/τ∗i ≡ p∗i(τ∗i,p wi). pwi = p∗i
x /py,i= B,C is the "world" (i.e. untaxed)
relative price or, equivalently, the ratio of exporter/producer prices for trade between the
home country and foreign country i. It represents foreign country i’s terms of trade while
its inverse is A’s bilateral terms of trade with each trading partner.10
Foreign country i buys good y internationally from country A at py, but its local price
is p∗i
y = τ∗ipy, whereas the local price of good x coincides with the producer or the exporter
price p∗i
x , as no export taxes or subsidies are in place. A h a st w op o s s i b l es o u r c ec o u n t r i e s
from which to buy good x at either p∗B
x or p∗C
x . It is natural to assume that consumers in the
home country are indiﬀerent between an homogenous good x coming from the two locations
B and C.11 Due to this perfect substitutability, A will be trading with both partners provided








o ri nt e r m so fr e l a t i v ep r i c e :
their most eﬃcient use.
10The terms of trade of a country is deﬁned as the price of its exports relative to the price of its imports.
11This preference could be represented by U(C∗i
x ,C∗i
y ) in foreign country i and U(Cx,C y) in the home country
with Cx = cxA+cxB+cxC being a linear subutility function. Cx is a quantity index giving the total amount
of good x consumed regardless of its origin. cxk,k= A,B,C is the units of good x manufactured in country
k and consumed in country A. The linearity makes good xk from the diﬀerent source countries perfect
substitutes, or equivalently, the indiﬀerence curves between these locations are linear.






which states that world prices are linked across bilateral trading relationships. (2) implies
that under MFN tariﬀs( τB = τC) a single world price pw = pwB = pwC arises, whereas when
A discriminates with its tariﬀ policy (τB 6= τC) - like in the case of a regional integration
agreements - there are diﬀerent world prices: pwB 6= pwC. (1) like (2) is the condition for an
interior solution - that is, A trades simultaneously with both its trading partners. Otherwise
A would be just trading with the source-country whose good can be oﬀered at a cheaper
local price, as it is the only good for which demand is positive.
Note that when A is a small country, its volume of trade are too limited to aﬀect p∗B
x
and p∗C
x w h i c ha r et a k e na sg i v e n .A s s u m i n gC is the lowest cost supplier (p∗C
x <p ∗B
x ), (1)
c a nn o tp o s s i b l yh o l dw i t haM F Nt a r i ﬀ, leading only to bilateral trade between the home
country and the cheapest source country.
When A is a large country, p∗B
x and p∗C
x are endogenously determined and depend on the
volume exchanged. In this context, C being the lowest cost supplier just means that it has a
grater comparative advantage relative to B and can therefore supply more quantities at the
same price. A allocates optimally its imports between the two foreign countries so that the
premium per good x (the excess of the tariﬀ-distorted domestic price over the world price) is
t h es a m ea c r o s sl o c a t i o n s .I ft h i si sn o tt h ec a s e( e . g .px−p∗B
x <p x−p∗C
x ), the tariﬀ revenue
per unit of good x will be greater from importing additional units of good x from C and
fewer from B. Such reallocation will continue until either the premia is driven to equality or
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until all imports come necessarily from a single source.
An MFN tariﬀ further implies that import mix from the two possible sources have to
equalize producer prices.
Production
Let Qk = Qk(p) and Q∗i
k = Q∗i
k (p∗i),k= x,y and i = B,C denote the optimal production
quantities of good k respectively in the home country and in foreign country i.12 The optimal
production quantity in each country is determined by the tangency point on the production
possibility frontier between the marginal rate of transformation between x and y and the
local relative price.
Consumption, Tariﬀ Revenue and GDP
Consumption in each country is a function of the local relative price and income. Given
that the tariﬀ/quota revenue is redistributed back to the consumers, national income for the
home country (foreign country i) will be the sum of the value of domestic production (GDP)
and tariﬀ revenue R (R∗i) expressed in units of the local export good at local prices:13
I(p,R)=pQx(p)+Qy(p)+R (3)
12Think of the production quantities as the result of proﬁt maximization of the representative ﬁrm in each
sector k. With the assumption of perfect competition, the amounts produced in each industry will maximize
the value of GDP at the local prices. That is, Qk(p) = argmaxQk {pQx(p)+Qy(p) s.t. PPF} where PPF
is the production possibility frontier. Analogously, Q∗i




13Think of the consumed quantities in each country as derived from the maximizing of the representative








x + pyC∗i = pxQ∗i
x + pyQ∗i
y + R∗i









Given that each country’s income is a function of local relative prices and revenue from
protection, consumption of good k can be represented by C∗i
k = C∗i
k (p∗i,R ∗i) for foreign
country i and by Ck = Ck(p,R) for the domestic economy for k = x,y.T h et a r i ﬀ revenue


























Denoting by M∗i(p∗i,p wi) ≡ C∗i
y (p∗i,R ∗i(p∗i,p wi))−Q∗i
y (p∗i) the imports of good y for foreign
country i and, similarly by E∗i
x (p∗i,p wi) ≡ Q∗i
x (p∗i)−C∗i
x (p∗i,R ∗i(p∗i,p wi)) foreign country i’s













Consumption in the domestic country is aﬀected by R which originates from trading
with both trading partners. Moreover, if A imposes a discriminatory trade policy, its tariﬀ
revenue will depend upon the total volume of x that it imports and the composition of this
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wi)=[ Cx(p,R) − Qx(p)](p − T)
≡ R(p,T)
s∗i is country A’s share of imports from foreign country i and T is an import share-
weighted average of the bilateral terms of trade. A reduction in T represents an improvement
in A’s multilateral terms of trade as much as a reduction in pwi represents an improvement
in its bilateral terms of trade with foreign country i.( 2 ) i m p l i e s T = pw under MFN
tariﬀs. Letting M(p,T) ≡ Cx(p,R(p,T)) − Qx(p) and E(p,T) ≡ Qy(p) − Cy(p,R(p,T)) be
respectively A’s total imports (of good x) and total exports (of good y) ,t h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t








wi) i = B,C (8)
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TM(p,T)=E(p,T) (9)
Note that for each foreign country, the production, consumption, import and export
quantities depend exclusively on the tariﬀs and the world prices. Indeed, once the latter are
determined, local prices can be determined too. Analogously, each quantity at home can be
expressed ultimately as a function of the local relative price p and the multilateral terms of
trade T.
Equilibrium with tariﬀs
Given a set of tariﬀ τ =( τB,τC,τ∗B,τ∗C) the equilibrium world prices pwB and pwC can








(10) is the market clearing condition for good x stating that the world demand for good x
is equal to its world supply and recall (2) is the condition for an interior solution. By Walras
law, (10), (8) and (9) ensure the market for good y clears as well14. (10) and (2) determine the
t w ou n k n o w nw o r l dp r i c e sw h i c ht o g e t h e rw i t ht h et a r i ﬀs determine the equilibrium values of
all local prices. In turn, all other quantities (domestic consumption and production, import
and export volumes, tariﬀ revenue) and the multilateral terms of trade can be derived.
Given the general form of the functions assumed, it is possible that anomalous but not
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impossible cases - such as the Metzler and the Lerner paradox - arise. The Metzler paradox
comprises a situation in which the domestic price of an imported good fall after a country
levies a tariﬀ on that good. This means that the sector which recieves a greater protection is
worse oﬀ after the introduction of the tariﬀ, so that resources move away from the protected
sector since it becomes less proﬁtable. The Lerner paradox refers to the situation in which
the terms of trade moves against the tariﬀ-imposing country. In other words, the shortage of
demand (excess of supply) that a country induces by imposing a tariﬀ on the imported good
does not yield a fall in the international price of that good and consequently an improvement
of the country’s terms of trade. Technically, this cases can arise because the oﬀer curve is not
necessarily well behaved (namely, monotonically increasing and concave to its import axis)
even if we assume underlying well behaved supply and demand schedules.15 I shall restrict
my focus to an equilibrium which lies on the upward-sloping segment of the oﬀer curve - the
so called "elastic" region.16
Therefore, I shall assume i) ∂pwi/∂τi ≤ 0 ≤ ∂pwi/∂τ∗i which ensures the terms of trade
are always an increasing function of each country’s own tariﬀs (no Lerner paradox). In
15For instance, an oﬀer curve for foreign country i can be derived solving:














and PPF is the production possibility frontier.
16The "elasticity" terminology comes from the fact that the oﬀer curve has a positive slope if and only if
the home country’s elasticity of demand for imports (with respect to the relative price of the importable)
exceeds unity. When the price of a good increases (say because a tariﬀ on this good is levied), it produces
three eﬀects: i) ap r o d u c t i o ne ﬀect (resources move in the sector whose good price has increased) ii) a
substitution eﬀect (consumer switch demand toward less expensive goods) iii) an income eﬀect (due to the
improved real income of a country associated to higher terms of trade). Eﬀects i) and ii) both contribute to
decrease imports of this good and increase exports of other goods. On the contrary, eﬀect iii) contributes
to raise imports of all goods. Restricting to the upward sloping segment of the oﬀer curve means focusing
on a situation where the income eﬀect iii) is dominated by i) and ii), so that an increase of the price of the
imported good leads to a reduction of its imported quantity.
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case of MFN tariﬀs( τC = τB = τ), these restrictions are simply ∂pw/∂τ ≤ 0 ≤ ∂pw/∂τ∗i.
Moreover, I shall assume that when other countries raise tariﬀs on one another, foreign
country i’s terms of trade improve - i.e. ii) ∂pwi/∂τj ≥ 0 (i 6= j)a n diii) ∂pwi/∂τ∗j ≥ 0
(i 6= j). Finally iv) dp/dτi > 0 and v) dp∗i/dτ∗i ≤ 0, rule out the Metzler paradox and
imply a restrictive trade policy always raise local prices. Recall that p = τipwi,s ot h a tt h e
total diﬀerential of this expression yields the change in the domestic price induced by a tariﬀ
change, namely dp/dτi = pwi + τidpwi/dτi. G i v e nt h a tt h el a s tt e r mi sn e g a t i v e( s i n c ea n
increase in τi improves A’s terms of trade), ruling out the Metzler pardox (i.e. dp/dτi ≥ 0)
is equivalent to assume that the terms of trade eﬀect induced by the tariﬀ are not so strong
to oﬀset the increment that a tariﬀ has on the domestic price of the good.
Note that the balanced trade conditions together with the market clearing conditions

















=( p − T)M(p,T)
where the intuition for the ﬁrst equality follows from the bilateral nature of the trading
relations which make foreign country i’s exports necessarily the home’s imports from i.
Note R∗i and R are an increasing function of foreign country i’s terms of trade, under our
assumption that goods are normal.
Furthermore, given that tariﬀ revenues are only functions of local relative prices and
world relative prices, also national incomes (3) and (4) are only functions of local and world
16RTAs formation and trade policy
relative prices.
Equilibrium with volume quotas
The bilateral nature of exchanges between A and each foreign country i ﬁxes B’s and C’s
exports of good x at the quantity level set by A’s import quota of mB units of good x from





i i = B,C. (12)
(10) becomes a tautology because A’s total imports are necessarily the sum of the two binding
volume quota restrictions. In addition, if foreign country i imposes a volume quota of m∗i
on its imports, world price pwi can be be explicitly determined by (8) as the ratio m∗i/mi.
When the only restrictions in place are A’s import quotas on imports from country C,
E∗C(p∗C,p wC)=mC still determines pwC and (10) determines the remaining unknown pwB.
This highlight a speciﬁcity of a quota with respect to a tariﬀ which is worth mentioning
as it will play a crucial role in the welfare analysis. If a quantitative restriction on imports
from C remains binding even after a reform that abolishes a formerly existing quota mB
imposed on imports from B, E∗C(p∗C,p wC)=mC will still ﬁx the level of imports from C
and the terms of trade at the pre-reform level. Thus, all the adjustments induced by the
reform aﬀect only the bilateral relations among B and A. On the contrary, a reform that
alters a pre-existing A’s MFN tariﬀsl o w e r i n go n l yt h et a r i ﬀ risen on imports from B will
lead to world price adjustments (see (2) and i) and ii) above).17 Intuitively, if the home
17An example would be a reform that lowers τB to 1 and leaves τC unaltered at τ.
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government taxes more heavily the exports of foreign country C, then the home demand
for exports from C is reduced whereas the home demand for exports from B is increased,
resulting in a terms of trade loss for C and a terms of trade gain for B. In this sense, the
tariﬀ protection is more likely to induce cross market eﬀects than quota protection.
This insight gives the intuition for a potentially more severe trade diversion in tariﬀ
protected than in quota restricted markets. Note, however, it is a feature of country-speciﬁc
volume quota. Were A restricting only its total imports of good x to M = mB + mC units
(global quota), the outcome would be similar to the tariﬀ case. Imports from each source
country would be allocated such that the quota premium is equalized across source country
( px − p∗B
x = px −p∗C
x ) or all imports come from the single source that maximizes the quota
premia. Indeed, there are several combinations of import-mixes from the two source countries
that can satisfy (10) with M held ﬁxed at M and the one chosen is maximizing the quota
premium. Thus, country-speciﬁc direct quantitative restrictions are more restrictive than an
equivalent global quota because they restrict the import mix to a speciﬁco n ew h i c hi sn o t
necessarily the optimal one.18
3 Regional Integration with diﬀerent trade policies
I shall consider now the welfare outcome of a regional integration (RI) policy under alter-
native trade policies. Without loss of generality, country A has the option to sign a trade
18Country-speciﬁc quotas are widely employed. The United States, for instance, imposes limitations on
imports of sugar on a country-by-country basis, with each speciﬁc exporting country having its own quota
allotment of sugar exports. Trade in textiles and apparel is managed in much the same way; importing
nations negotiate country-speciﬁc import targets with each signiﬁcant exporter. See Markunsen et. al
(1995).
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agreement with B reducing preferentially trade barriers to the member country (B), but
leaving unaltered those raised vis-à-vis non-member countries (C).
The desirability of a RIA has to be evaluated according to some welfare measure and I
shall assume national governments maximize national income. This choice corresponds to
national governments maximizing the indirect utility function v of the representative con-
sumer. Therefore, V (p,T)=v(p,I(p,T)) measures A’s welfare and, similarly V ∗i(p∗i,p wi)=
v(p∗i,I∗i(p∗i,p wi)) represents the welfare of foreign country i.19
Countries may trade in two diﬀerent policy regimes. In the ﬁrst one, all countries are
making use of tariﬀ measures to protect national industries - as in the 70s. The initial




I ), I for initial. Then, A and B join into a FTA which
gives free access to the internal market only to member countries, leaving trade barriers
against non member countries unaltered (reform t hereafter). Thus, the post reform tariﬀ
vector (indexed by t)i sτt =( 1 ,τC
I ,1,τ∗C
I ).T h a t i s , A and B trade freely one another.
Given that C i sn o tp a r to ft h ea g r e e m e n ta n di t st a r i ﬀ level is unchanged after the reform,
for simplicity I shall set τ∗C =1 , meaning it is trading freely before and after the reform.
Therefore, τI =( τB
I ,τC
I ,τ∗B
I ,1) and τt =( 1 ,τC
I ,1,1).
Consequently, let me denote as VI the welfare associated to the pre-agreement equilibrium
and likewise, Vt the welfare associated to the post-agreement equilibrium when trade is
restricted by tariﬀs.
19Bagwell and Staiger (2002) show that government preferences can be generalized to allow for a wide range
of economic and political motivations.
19RTAs formation and trade policy
In the second one - as in the 90s -trade is initially restricted by direct quantitative
restrictions and countries A and B undergo through the same kind of piecemeal reform
which liberalizes the internal market to member countries while it leaves unchanged the





s ) (s for start) is the pre-agreement quota vector and mq =( no,mC
s ,no,m∗C
s )
is the post-reform quota vector. no in the ﬁrst element of this vector means that no vol-
ume quota is in place in country A for imports of good x from B. As above, I shall as-




and mq =( no,mC
s ,no,no). Thus, the volume quota faced by C remains the only restric-
tion in place after the FTA is signed. Obviously, Vs denotes the welfare associated to the
pre-agreement equilibrium and likewise, Vq the welfare associated to the post-agreement
equilibrium when trade is restricted by volume quota.
As well established in the literature, such partial reforms should be evaluated in terms
of terms of trade and eﬃciency eﬀects. As shown in Grinols and Wong (1991) and Ju
and Krishna (2000a), reform q can ensure Pareto gains (s0, Vq ≥ Vs) through a system of
self-ﬁnancing lump sum transfers provided that the following condition holds:20
20This formula is derived in the appendix. See also Feenstra(2004). The intuition is that the revenue R
collected after the implementation of the reform can be used to ﬁnance a system of lump sum transfers
which compensates losers and taxes gainers. This redistributive policy aims at equilibrating the uneven
beneﬁt distribution arising with the trade reform and therefore can achieve Pareto gains for all consumers.













































s )] ≥ 0
that is, regionalism integration must avoid adverse terms of trade or eﬃciency eﬀects to
ensure Pareto gains. The ﬁrst line in (13) indicates the impact of the reform on the terms
of trade: if the RTA reduces (increases) the price of imports (exports), it will contribute
positively to raise welfare. The last two lines are the change in tariﬀ revenue evaluated
at the post-reform tariﬀ vector (see (11)) and represent eﬃciency gains.21 Trade diversion
means that A switches the supplier from outside the FTA (where tariﬀ revenue is collected)
to another within the FTA (with no tariﬀ revenue), so that tariﬀ revenue falls. The last two
lines would then be negative. Thus, RTAs should reduce trade diversion as much as possible
to be welfare enhancing. It is worth mentioning that (13) is a suﬃcient condition, so that its
violation does not mean the reform under evaluat i o ni saf a i l u r eap r i o r i ,b u ti tj u s tn e e d sa
careful examination.
It is instructive to consider ﬁrst the small open economy, ﬁrst. It allows to abstract from
terms of trade and focus closely only on the diﬀerent degree of trade diversion implied by
the two diﬀerent instruments of trade policy. Then, I shall analyze the large country case
21See Feenstra (2004). The tariﬀ reﬂects the diﬀerence between domestic and international prices: if positive,
that indicates that marginal costs at home exceed international prices, so it would be more eﬃcient for the
country to import the good. Therefore the term (pq − pwi
q )[E∗i(p∗i
q ,p wi
q ) − E∗i(p∗i
s ,p wi
s )] gives a measure
of the eﬃciency gain by attracting imports towards the highest-tariﬀ sectors after the implementation of a
reform.
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where the same mechanisms of trade diversion interact with terms of trade eﬀects, making
t h ea n a l y s i sm o r ec u m b e r s o m e .
Given that the literature on regional integration has found trade diversion theoretically
and empirically relevant, the interesting case is represented by a potential trade diverting
agreement.
Therefore, I shall consider C - the outside union member - as the lowest cost supplier
or the cheapest source country in the small open economy. In the large economy, C has
a comparative advantage in good x relative to B, translating in greater export supply for
any given world price. Note that trade diverting agreements do not need to be necessarily
welfare decremental, but they can be welfare enhancing.22 In particular, I am interested in
whether such agreements are welfare enhancing when trade protection is achieved through
N T B s ,s ot h a tt h ef o r m a t i o no fR I A si nt h e9 0 sc a nb er e l a t e dt ot h eo b s e r v e dc h a n g ei nt h e
nature of trade protection.
3.1 The small open economy case
The small open economy is illustrative of how a volume quota has diﬀerent eﬀects from tariﬀ
when a country undergoes a piecemeal tariﬀ reforms.
The assumption of a small open economy ensures that:
• A’s trade policy does not aﬀect the terms of trade with the two possible suppliers, B
and C, but only the relative domestic prices p ≡ px/py. As world prices do not change
22Trade diverting preferential agreement are necessarily welfare reducing under two speciﬁc assumptions: i)
no substitution in consumption and ii) a linear production possibility frontier. See Markunsen et. al. (1995).
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in response of a trade reform, I shall denote them as pwB and pwCwithout any subindex
(I,s,t,q).
• B’s and C’s supply is inﬁnitively elastic at the world relative price pwi, i = B,C for
trade with A, with pwC <p wB,a sC is assumed to be the lowest cost supplier,. Assume
further that pwC ≤ pwB ≤ τC
I pwC = p,t h a ti st h a tB’s terms of trade with A is lower
than the tariﬀ-distorted domestic price of good x coming from C.23
To see how the two types of instruments lead to diﬀerent adjustment mechanisms when a
RIA is joined, suppose country A is initially protecting its industries by a MFN ad valorem
tariﬀ tI = tB
I = tC
I .I m p o r t s f r o m B would be more expensive than imports from C (by
assumption pwB ≥ pwC), and could be sold domestically only at a higher price (τIpwB ≥
τIpwC) - so that (2) is violated and A will be only trading with C. Indeed, given that C
is willing to supply all M(pI,p wC
I ) at the world price pwC, all imports of x come from C.24
Thus, in equilibrium there are only bilateral relations among A and C,b u tt h et a r i ﬀ revenue
is positive and given by (11).25
However, when A grants preferential access to its market only to country B and retains
t h es a m et a r i ﬀ on imports from C, the relative domestic price of good x imported from B
becomes pt = pwB, lower than the price τIpwC at which each unit imported from C could
possibly be sold in A.G i v e n t h a tA’s total import demand at pwB is completely satisﬁed,
23This assumption puts A into the situation of a trade diverting agreement.
24In other words, (10) is M(pI,p wC
I )=E∗C(p∗C
I ,p wC
I ) and E∗B(p∗B
I ,p wB
I )=0 . As shown in section (2), (2)
can not possible hold in the small open economy with MFN tariﬀ. The equilibrium is necessarily a corner
solution where A trades only with partner C.
25Obviously E∗B(pI,p wB
I )=0in (??), as the equilibrium is in the corner solution where A trades only with
C.
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trade is completely diverted from country C to country B. In this case, in equilibrium only
A and B trade each other and the tariﬀ revenue is lost because all imports come from a
union-members to which no tariﬀ is applied.
The outcome diﬀers under the NTBs regime. Suppose that A initially sets a global
quota Ms on the total number of units of x imported. Assume that it is binding and, for
expositional simplicity, it is the tariﬀ-equivalent quota (i.e. Ms = E∗C(pwC
I )), that is the
implicit ad valorem tariﬀ associated to it is tI.26 Therefore, the initial equilibrium is formally
identical to the the initial tariﬀ-ridden equilibrium with all units imported exclusively from
C and sold domestically at the tariﬀ-distorted domestic price ps = pI = τIpwC. Therefore,
the tariﬀ revenue collected is the same too.
After A j o i n si n t oaR I Aw i t hB, A will be trading freely with B, but it can also keep
trading with C within the limits imposed by the volume quota Ms, now imposed exclusively
on imports from C.N o t e t h a t C faces an import restriction as high as it was before the
agreement, while B beneﬁts from the removal of all trade barriers. Since the international
prices at which country A can make international transactions are not aﬀected by this policy,
a quota-license holder can make positive proﬁt by buying x from the lowest cost supplier C
at pwC and re-sell it at the higher domestic price pq = pwB. All license holders will have an
incentive to use entirely their license and the amount of x imported from C is therefore Ms.
This is an equilibrium because C is willing to supply all the Ms units at pwC,w h e r e a sB
26The equivalence result between a tariﬀ and a quota due to Bhagwati (1965) holds - in the sense that a tariﬀ
rate will produce an import level which, if alternatively set as a quota, will produce an identical discrepancy
between foreign and domestic prices.
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serves the residual import demand (Mq − Ms)a tpwB.27 All three countries end up trading
simultaneously and therefore some revenue Rq =( pwB − pwC)Ms from industry protection
c a nb em a i n t a i n e de v e na f t e rt h ei m p l e m e n t a t ion of the agreement. The part of the original
revenue that is given up (pI − pwB)Ms reﬂects exactly the reduced economic value of the
quota which is not as stringent as it was before the integration.28 Indeed, those units of
imports desired by country A in excess of the quota limit that could not be imported before
the agreement, can now be imported from Country B.
Although the partial reform implemented under the two diﬀerent types of protection has
identical eﬀects on A’s relative domestic prices (i.e. pq = pt = pwB), the composition of
t h ev o l u m eo ft r a d ea c r o s st h et w os u p p l i e ri sr a t h e rd i ﬀerent as trade diversion does not
occur under quantitative restrictions to trade. With quota protection, A expands its volume
of trade with B (trade creation), but trades with C e x - p o s ta sm u c ha si td i de x - a n t et h e
agreement, whereas with tariﬀ protection, trade diversion alters the pre-union trade patterns
between A and C. Only the FTA implemented in presence of quota restrictions preserves the
imports and the exports with the rest of the world and results therefore welfare improving
as shown by Krishna and Panagariya (2002). This observation is the essence of the diﬀerent
welfare consequence of a trade agreement under the two types of trade policy instruments.
This diﬀerent degree of trade diversion implied by the two types of trade barriers will
extend naturally to the large country case. Therefore I shall defer the formal proof of this
result till later in the more general case of large countries.
27The binding quota ensures the desired imports of good x necessarily exceed the Ms units after the agree-
ment is in place.
28The pre-agreement quota rent is RI =( pI − pwC)Ms =[ ( pI − pwB) − (pwB − pwC)]Ms.
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Note that such conclusion would still hold if A were initially setting country speciﬁc
import restrictions mB and mC. After a RTA that abolishes just mB, but it leaves un-
changed the quota raised on imports from C at mC, A’s post-agreement purchases from C
are unchanged provided that this quota is still binding.
3.2 The large economy case
Although a small country always gain from reform q, a large country may not do so if such
reform leads to adverse terms of trade eﬀects. Let pwB
s and pwC
s the world price in the pre-
agreement equilibrium determined by (12). Note that E∗C is an increasing function of only
pwCas C does not protect its imports (i.e. p∗C
s = pwC
s ). Supposing mC
s k e e p sb eb i n d i n ga f t e r
the reform, (12) implies that the terms of trade with C are unchanged (i.e. pwC
q = pwC
s )
and, in turn, M∗C(pwC
q )=M∗C(pwC
s ) by (8). (10) implies that also the terms of trade with
B are ﬁxed at their initial value (i.e. pwB
q = pwB
s ), as proved in the appendix.29 Therefore,
after the reform is implemented, A is trading with partner C as much as it was doing before
the reform was approved, importing and exporting the same quantities. This is the criteria
for welfare enhancing Free Trade Areas proposed by Krishna and Panagariya (2002). The
preservation of trade volumes with non-members countries guarantees that their terms of
trade and, in turn, their welfare is preserved (i.e. V ∗C
s = V ∗C
q ) too. To see that it also
improves the welfare of participating government, it is easy to verify that (13) is satisﬁed




s = M(ps,T s)−
E∗B(p∗B
s ,p wB
s ). Given market x is intially clearing at (pwC
s ,p wB
s ), it necessarily keeps clearing at these world




q . Indeed, the increase in B’s export supply matches





so that market x necessarily clears at the same pre-reform world prices.
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being equal to zero. The ﬁr s tl i n ei s0 because the world price vector is unchanged and,
therefore countries in the FTA do not experience terms of trade gains or loss. The second
line is 0 as no quota premium arises from FTA members (p∗B
q − pwB
q =0 ). Finally, the






s )). Clearly, this agreement increases B’s
volume of trade, contributing to raise its welfare too - see the appendix (7.1).30 Henceforth,
the agreement is mutually favorable. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A RIA between the home country and foreign country i that abolishes volume
quota one another leaving unaltered former volume import restrictions vis-á-vis non-member
country j is welfare enhancing, provided that such import restrictions keep being binding after
the agreement is implemented.
A FTA implemented in presence of quota restricted trade does not yield terms of trade
gains, but it also avoids any trade diversion. This is enough to ensure the possibility to
achieve Pareto gains through a system of transfers among consumers and, more importantly,
among countries. The intuition for this result is suggested by the literature on piecemeal tariﬀ
reform.31 Since following reform q, some binding quota are relaxed with others remained ﬁxed
and there are no other distorted markets, the welfare change is positive because the relaxation
in any quota unambiguously enlarges the economy’s consumption set. Importantly, these
gains from consumption are not oﬀset by adverse terms of trade eﬀects.
30It can be directly veriﬁed that (24) in the appendix - a formula like (13) for foreign country ∗B -h o l d s .
The ﬁrst term is 0 since reform q has no terms of trade eﬀect. The second term is 0 as no quota is risen on
imports from member countries (i.e. the implicit tariﬀ is t∗B =0 ). If B had multiple partners too, trade
patterns would be symmetric to A,e x p o r t i n gx to both the union country A and a third country outside the
FTA and importing y from a union country A and the third country outside the union. Thus, the question
of whether union formation is welfare improving for each member country could be analyzed in the same
way for both members of the union. Since the FTA results welfare-enhancing for A,i tw o u l db es of o rB
too.
31See Vousden (1990), chapter 9 pag pag 217.
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I think of this proposition as an indication of the desirability of regionalism in presence
of quota-restricted trade. This is known as the "compensation principle" due to Chipman
(1987) - in the sense that if regional integration agreements combined with lump-sum trans-
fers could make everyone better oﬀ, then we accept such reform itself as a worthwhile policy,
even when the transfers are not made. Indeed, the knowledge required to implement the
long list of lump sum compensatory payments, some of them international in nature, make
the practical implementation of these transfers very diﬃcult.
Obviously, proposition (1) holds for a small country too, as (13) is satisﬁed by the small
country above.
On the contrary, reform t is not necessarily welfare improving because the trade diversion
induces terms of trade movements as well. The initial equilibrium world prices pwC
I , pwB
I solve
(10) and (2). After the reform t, the elimination of tariﬀ within the FTA reduces the local





whereas by (2), C’s terms of trade worsen (pwC
t ≤ pwC
I ) to preserve competitiveness in the
union market.32 This appreciation of A’s terms of trade against C originates from the trade
diversion of imports formerly coming from the outside member country in favor of intra-union
imports (i.e. E∗C(pwC
t ) ≤ E∗C(pwC
I )). The elimination of tariﬀ on union trade shifts out both
A’s import demand and B’s export supply. Depending on this relative shifts, B’s terms of
trade may appreciate or depreciates. First, suppose it appreciates (1 ≤ pwB
t /pwB
I ≤ τB
I )-f o r





I ] follows from pt = pwB
t ≤ τB
I pwB








I follows from τC
I pwC
t = pt ≤ pI = τC
I pwC
I . This is fully consistent with price restriction i) and ii).
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cleared out. Replacing q with t and s with I, (13) is not necessarily positive: the second line
is 0 as no tariﬀ is levied on member’s imports, whereas the third line is negative as trade
diversion reduces tariﬀ revenue from non-members countries. Finally, the ﬁrst term in the
ﬁrst line is negative while the second term is positive. For welfare to raise, favorable terms
of trade eﬀects against non-member countries have to be strong enough to compensate for
both terms of trade loss vis-à-vis member countries and eﬃciency loss.
Supposing instead that (pwB
t ≤ pwB
I ), welfare gains are more likely as A experiences
favorable terms of trade eﬀects with both member and non-member trading partners which
can oﬀset the eﬃciency loss associated to trade diversion (the negative term in the last line
of (13).
Note for the small open economy above, Pareto gains can not be ensured either, since (13)
is violated. The ﬁr s tt w ol i n e sa r ec l e a r l y0 ,w h e r e a st h el a s tl i n ei sn e g a t i v eb e c a u s eo ft r a d e
diversion. The intuition is again that trade diversion associated to the preferential reduction
of tariﬀs may not necessarily translates into the enlargement of the economy’s consumption
set, especially when imports are just diverted from one source to another. Moreover, adverse
terms of trade plausibly associated to trade diversion make imports more expensive and
reduce welfare.
It is worth pointing out a number of interesting features of this result.
First, the desirability of reform t has to be evaluated empirically case by case, as widely
recognized in the literature. For instance, Grinols (1984) ﬁnds that Great Britain incurred
in a welfare loss when it joined the European Economic Community in 1973 and (13) was
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evaluated to be negative. In contrast, proposition (1) suggests a general desirability of
reform q which can provide an explanation for a renewed interest in RIAs policy in the 90s.
Indeed, policy makers are usually working in a second best world, attempting to reduce some
distortions while others remaining ﬁrmly in place. As we know from the theory of second
best, such changes do not necessarily increase welfare. However, it would be helpful to have
some simple rules - a rule of thumb - telling them "which way is up". Then, Proposition (1)
suggests reform q can be readily understood and implemented by policy makers with some
conﬁdence that a welfare improvement will be the outcome.33
Second, because "the way up" is so clear when all trade barriers consists of quantitative
restrictions, it would appear that the diﬃculty of identifying welfare-enhancing FTA can be
resolved simply by converting all explicit taxes or subsidies to quotas and then gradually
relaxing the quotas. Such an approach runs counter to the view of reform which is popular
to most policy makers and adopted by the WTO in 1995, that is change quotas to tariﬀs
and then set about reducing the tariﬀs - so called "tariﬃcation" process. However, quotas
have many other disadvantages relative to tariﬀs, particularly in the presence of monopoly
and/or foreign retaliation, and such considerations presumably are what motivate the pop-
ular view.34
T h i r d ,t h ew e l f a r eo u t c o m eo fr e f o r mq and reform t is diﬀerent, though both reforms leave
unaltered former trade barriers against non-member countries. This is the criteria established
33This has some analogies with the large literature on piecemeal tariﬀ reforms. A number of economists have
looked for simple piecemeal reform rules that could be leading to welfare enhancing outcomes with some
conﬁdence. Examples of such rule of thumb rules are proportional reduction of all trade taxes or reduction
of the highest tariﬀ rate ﬁrst. See Vousden (1990), Chapter 9 for a review.
34See Vousden (1990), chapter 4, 5 and 6.
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by GATT-WTO regulations to permit preferential trade agreements. Article XXIV of GATT
explicitly imposes “the duties (with outside parties) shall not on the whole be higher or more
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties...prior to the formation”. This criteria
naturally implements the eﬃcient rule for welfare-enhancing FTA in case of NTBs, as it helps
to keep purchases from the rest of the world ﬁxed. In contrast, in case of tariﬀ protection
(reform t), it is unable to lead to welfare improving FTA as this principle does not suﬃce,
on its own, to preserve trade volumes with non-member countries. As shown by Bagwell and
Staiger (2004), the FTA would do so if only complies with two other principles of GATT-
WTO - namely reciprocity and MFN. However a FTA could not possibly respect MFN as,
by deﬁnition, it is a legal recognized exception to it.
Fourth, the model suggests that when a RTA is implemented in presence of NTBs, the
terms of trade vis-à-vis non member countries should be preserved. This seems at odd with
the empirical ﬁndings by Chang and Winters (2002) of favourable terms of trade eﬀects of
MERCOSUR for Brazil vis-à-vis US, Japan, Germany, South Korea and Chile, who are all
exporting into the union-area. However, Mercosur entailed also tariﬀ reductions which can
lead to terms of trade eﬀects as predicted by the model (reform t). Moreover, it is important
to note that the preservation of trade volumes with non-member countries is a speciﬁcity
of country-speciﬁc volume quotas. Consequently, terms of trade eﬀects can also occur in
presence of only quantitative restrictions, when, for instance, a RTA provides that countries
relax a global import volume quota or a formerly employed VERs. Given the empirical
relevance of VERs in trade policies, next section will consider them speciﬁcally and show
31RTAs formation and trade policy
that, indeed, may lead to favourable terms of trade improvements for member countries and
loss for non member countries as for Brazil after Mercosur.35
4R I A s a n d V E R s
A VER is a quota imposed by an exporting country on its exports to another country in




s ) where foreign country i imposes a VER of mi
s units of good x,
whereas A restricts its exports to m∗B
s units of good y toward B, mirrors the protection
achieved by the initial import-volume quota vector ms. The equivalent of reform q in terms
of VERs relaxation (hereafter denoted as reform v) implemented by a bilateral agreement
yields the post-reform VER-vector mv =( no,no,no,mC
s ). For an exporter in foreign country
i, a unit of the exported good x is more valuable on the international market than on the
domestic market (i.e. px ≥ p∗i
x ) due to the artiﬁcial scarcity created by a VER. Analogously,
for a home exporter, the international price of the exported good y beneﬁts from such
artiﬁcial restrain and results above its domestic price (i.e. p∗i
y ≥ py). Then, the untaxed or
"world" relative price at which international transactions are made is given by e pi = px/p∗i
y
which still represents foreign country i’s terms of trade and the ratio of exporter prices. With
35VERs have become most pervasive in the textiles and clothing area, applying to 80% of the world trade
in these industries through the various bilateral agreement which constitutes the Multiﬁbre Arrangement
(MFA). They are also particularly in evidence in the steel industry, in which they limit steel exports from
Japan and the EEC to the USA. They were employed in the automobile industry, in which they restricted
exports from Japan to the USA, Germany, France, UK and Italy. For example, after 1981, the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) told each auto manufacturer in Japan how much it
could export to the U.S. In the late 1980s, US and the European countries rescinded their request to Japan
for restricted automobile exports. Later on, they have begun to be applied to a range of electronic consumer
goods. As documented by Laird and Yeats (1990), over the period 1981-1986 a major shift has occurred in
the use of VERs on import volumes as opposed to other forms of NTBs.
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this deﬁnition, relative domestic prices are in the same relation with world prices as above
(i.e. p∗i ≤ e pi ≤ p) and (8) is still foreign country i budget constrain with pwi replaced by e pi.
One major diﬀerence with the import quota case analyzed above, is that both E∗C and
E∗B are vertical at mC
s and mB
s when VERs are binding and do not pin down world prices.














with e T =
P
i∈B,C e si/e pi and e si = M∗i(p∗i, e pi)/M ∗B(p∗B, e pB)+M∗C(p∗C, e pC).36 Note that.
diﬀerently from above, an increase in e T represents an improvement in A’s multilateral terms
of trade. (15) determines e pB
o while (14) pins down e To and, in turn, e pC
o .37 Generally, e pi
o will
result diﬀerent from the terms of trade pwi
s because C and B a r em o v i n gt h et e r m so ft r a d e
in their favour by imposing a VER whereas, in the import quota case, was A to beneﬁt
from the terms of trade appreciation with the imposition of a country-speciﬁc quota to each
of its trading partners. Moreover, revenue formerly collected with the imposition of such
import quotas, accrues under the VER scheme to foreign country i, implying quite diﬀerent
lump sum transfers for consumers of country A. In turn, in general equilibrium models,
also relative domestic prices will be generally diﬀerent in the two situations (ps 6= po and
36To develop an intuition it is useful to think of VERs in terms of implicit export taxes. t∗i is the export
tax levied by foreign government i on its exports of good x - so that an exporter receives p∗i
x =( 1− t∗i)px.
tB is the export tax imposed by A on exports directed to B, while tC =0-s ot h a ta ne x p o r t e ri nt h eh o m e
country receives py =( 1−tB)p∗B
y when it sells the good in market B and py = p∗C
y when it sells its good in
market C. Export taxes and import tariﬀs have qualitatively the same eﬀects because they distort domestic
prices in the same manner favouring the import-competitive sector.
37Actually e pB
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p∗i
s 6= p∗i
o ) because of income eﬀects associated with changes in the terms of trade.
After the implementation of the RTA between A and B, only the VER imposed by C
on its exports is ﬁrmly in place and assumed to be binding, which implies that E∗C is still
vertical at mC
s . Clearly, the export quantities toward A are preserved, but, diﬀerently from
the import quota case, the terms of trade are not necessarily preserved because, under a
binding VER only this quantity is supplied regardless of its price. By (8), the terms of trade
would be unchanged if only the quantity imported by C were also unchanged.
T h em a r k e to fg o o dy results free of protection and country A has two potential buyers,
namely B and C. Of course, A would maximize its export revenue by selling to the best
buyer and will allocate to it all its exports unless the price per unit of good exported is
not driven to equality by such allocation (i.e. p∗B
y = p∗C
y ). Therefore, the post-agreement
equilibrium in which A is trading with both partners is characterized by the following market









v = e p
C
v (17)
The y market clearing condition E(e Tv)=M∗B(e pv)+M∗C(p∗C
v , e pv) implied by (16) and
(8) provides us with an intuition for the eﬀects of the RTA. Initially, the allocation of A’s
exports to its partners is constrained by the A’s VER of m∗B
s units of good y (see (15)).
Following the trade liberalization, A will wish to export more units and its allocation among
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its trading partners is driven by revenue maximization. Very likely, such optimal export
mix toward its trading partners is diﬀerent from the original export mix and leads to terms
of trade movements. In particular, it can be shown (see the appendix) that the eﬀect on
e pB
v is ambiguous, while e pC
v and M∗C are smaller than initially. The preserved exchanges of
good x between A and C does not longer suﬃce to preserve the volumes traded of good y
as well as the terms of trade. Therefore, negotiated bilateral agreements for the elimination
of VERs also have favourable terms of trade eﬀects for the the negotiating parties vis-à-vis
third parties.
As shown in the appendix, it is possible to express the suﬃcient condition for Pareto



















































o , e p
C
o ) ≥ 0
where the ﬁrst line is 0 in my framework because A does not employ any VER after
reform v is implemented. Therefore, Pareto gains only depend on terms of trade movements.
In particular, when both e pB
v ≤ e pB
o and e pC
v ≤ e pC
o , Pareto gains can be ensured, otherwise
possible adverse terms of trade with member countries have to be oﬀset by gains vis-à-vis
non member countries. Most remarkably, Pareto gains for country A under a VER reform
are more likely than under reform t,a l t h o u g hb o t hr e f o r m st and v entail similar terms of
trade eﬀects. The reason is that country A had already given up its tariﬀ revenue when it
negotiated a VER protection and regionalism (reform v) has no consequences for the loss of
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such revenue in this case. In contrast, (13) showed that favourable terms of trade induced
by reform t had in any case to compensate for tariﬀ revenue loss (the negative term in the
third line) to ensure Pareto gains.38
5 Comparison of the diﬀerent strategies to RIAs
We have shown that policy makers may be quite conﬁdent about pursuing regional inte-
gration policies to rise the well being of countries in a context where trade is restricted by
NTBs, while the outcome of this strategy is quite case-speciﬁca n dn e e d sm o r ec a r e f u le v a l -
uation in a context of tariﬀ restricted trade. However, in many cases, the option for such
preferential reforms may still represent an improvement relative to pre-existent tariﬀ-ridden
trade relations. In spite of a more generalized desirable welfare outcome of RTAs in presence
of NTBs, it would be interesting to be able to compare the size of the gains associated to
piecemeal reforms with either type of instruments. In terms of the notation of my model,
I am interested in comparing gains from a reform q relative to those arising under reform
t (i.e.Vq − Vs vs. Vt − VI). This enables us to construct useful counterfactuals. Would a
country joining into a regional trade agreement in the 70s have gained at least as much had
it signed the same agreement twenty years after at the end of the 80s? Or would a country
recently joining into an agreement in presence of NTBs gained more or less had it enrolled
into this agreement much earlier in the 70s when tariﬀ rather than NTBs were in place?
Therefore, these counterfactual are useful to shed some light on how attractive and valid is
38Note that if A were imposing initially a VER to both its trading partner and leaving its VER unalterated
against country C after reform v, trade diversion translates into rents loss and gains from regionalism would
be less plausible as well.
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t h eo p t i o nf o raR T Ai nt h e9 0 sf o rac o u n t r yf o rw h i c hi tw a sn o tw o r t hj o i n i n gi n t oa n
agreement in the 70s.
In such thought experiments, it is important to attribute any change in the welfare only
to the piecemeal tariﬀ/quota reform. Clearly, Vs = VI would ensure A has the same initial
welfare with either trade policy and therefore any welfare change can be attributed to the
diﬀerent adjustments implied by volume quota liberalization and tariﬀ liberalization in the
process of a RTA reform. The assumption of a competitive market for import quota licenses
ensures the equivalence result between a tariﬀ and a volume quota holds.39 Therefore, the
levels of prices, production, consumption, imports, exports and transfers of rents to the
protected industry prevailing in the pre-reform equilibrium with tariﬀ are identical to those
characterizing the pre-agreement equilibrium with NTBs. It follows the welfare associated
to both equilibrium must coincide, i.e. Vs = VI. Given this equivalence, Vq − Vs ≥ Vt − VI
reduces to study under which conditions A is better oﬀ in the q equilibrium as opposed to













































t )] ≥ 0
(19) clearly holds for a small country: the ﬁrst line is necessarily 0 because the terms of
trade are taken as given (pwB
t = pwB
q = pwB); the second line is also 0 as no quota rents arise
39See Bhagwati (1965).
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from member countries (i.e. pq = pwB
q ). Finally, the third line is positive and it represents
exactly the change in tariﬀ revenue from t to the q equilibrium.40 Therefore, the following
proposition holds true for a small country.
Proposition 2 For a small country with a competitive market for import quota licenses,
Vq − Vs ≥ Vt − VI.
Proof. See the appendix for a direct proof.
Note that this proposition holds true also when VER-protection is considered, as it is
shown in the appendix. However, this result does not extend to a large country setting
due to possible adverse term of trade eﬀects. Recall that the MFN tariﬀ together with the
equivalence result which is assumed to hold, imply that pwB
s = pwB
I = pw = pwC
I = pwC
s .









I ] and pwC
t ≤ pwC
I . Like for a small country, the last term in (19)
is positive also for a large country because NTBs imply a lower degree of trade diversion
resulting in E∗C(pwC
q ) ≥ E∗C(pwC
t ).41 Supposing pwB
t ≥ pwB
q ,t h eﬁrst term in the ﬁrst line
is positive as imports from B are cheaper in the q equilibrium, but the second term on the
same line is negative as trade diversion in equilibrium t is compensated by favorable terms
of trade movements. Unless trade of terms gain vis-à-vis non member countries are so strong
to oﬀset all other forces, (19) is likely satisﬁed for a large country who therefore would also
gain relative more from a regional integration pursued in presence of NTBs. However, if
40Recall that for a small country, after reform q is implemented, imports from C are exactly the quota limit
(E∗C(p∗C
q ,p wC
q )=Ms) and following reform t, E∗C(p∗C
t ,p wC






I .G i v e n E∗C is an increasing function of world relative price,
E∗C(pwC
q ) ≥ E∗C(pwC
t ).
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pwB
t ≤ pwB
q ,t h eﬁrst term turns to be negative and the inequality will less likely be satisﬁed
since stronger eﬃciency gains would be needed. In other words, the strongest the terms
of trade gain achieved after the implementation of reform t relative to those attained with
reform q, the less likely the welfare outcome of reform q is Pareto superior to the one arising
after reform t.
To develop the intuition for this result, it is useful to express the outcome of reform t
in its quota-equivalent me. Indeed, a volume quota of me = E∗C(pwC
t ) ≤ mC
s set by A on
imports from C would deliver the same outcome of reform t induced by the tariﬀ vector
τI. In equilibrium q, the quota vector results less stringent than in equilibrium t since
mt =( 1 ,me,1,1) ≤ mq =( 1 ,mC
s ,1,1). Then, in the thought experiment of a transaction
from equilibrium t to equilibrium q, a small country would necessarily gain as this less
stringent constraint on imports unambiguously enlarges its consumption possibilities. This
result does not extend to large country because of terms of trade eﬀects associated to trade
diversion. Recall that pwB
t ,pwB




q , A would suﬀer a terms of trade loss from this hypothetical
transaction. Such loss could erode the gains from consumption related to this hypothetical
reform since A would end up paying more for all its imports.
Finally, proposition (1) and proposition (2) together suggests that the option for region-
alism has turned positive for small and some large countries only in the 90s in presence of
quota restricted trade. However, these countries may have correctly anticipated that such
valuable option for integration was temporary restricted by the WTO prescription to convert
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all NTBs in tariﬀ-equivalent measures and destined to expire. Therefore, such "tariﬃcation"
process - established at the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994 and to be completed
gradually by 2005 - was easily foreseen by WTO member countries and it may have hurried
governments to realize their valuable option. This may be a further contributing factor to
the regionalism spurt observed between the 1990 and the ﬁrst years of 2000.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses a two goods, three countries, general equilibrium model to relate two well
known features of trading relations, namely the proliferation and expansion of preferential
trade agreements in the 90s to the change in the nature of trade protection occurred over
the last thirty years.
It was shown that trade agreements implemented in presence of quota restricted trade
naturally implements an explicit-volume preservation rule and, therefore, they result welfare
improving. The relevance of this is twofold. First, an explicit volume preservation rule which
result cumbersome to implement and very diﬀerent from the actual WTO prescriptions for
PTAs, result naturally implementable and, more importantly, induced by the WTO rules in
presence of quota restricted trade. Second, for small and some large countries, preferential
trade has become a "positive-dividend" option only in the 90s, when trade was more quota-
restricted than in the past, justifying a renewed policy interest for regionalism in the last
ﬁfteen years. At the basis of this result is the diﬀerent mechanism with which a tariﬀ and a
q u o t ao p e r a t e :w h i l eat a r i ﬀ has direct eﬀect on prices, a quota operates on quantities and
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aﬀects prices only indirectly. Because a tariﬀ increases the prices of all imports from non-
member countries, it may cause union-member to become artiﬁcially the lowest cost supplier.
Trade is then diverted from non-members toward members of a FTA. Under quota protection
this does not occur and a country can still import from the world lowest cost supplier provided
that it does not exceed the quota limit. In turn, the pre-agreement volumes of trade are
preserved.
Most likely, such beneﬁts associated to regional integration would have expired as soon
as countries had complied with the "tariﬃcation" process established by the WTO in 1995
and to be completed in the following ten years. Anticipating such eventuality, governments
may have hurried to sign agreements under negotiation.
While this paper contributes to shed some light on the spurt of regionalism in the 90s, it
can not provide any answer to the types of agreements signed. Trade policy can not explain
whether North-North or South.South or, as more common in the last years, North-South
agreements are signed. These themes are certainly worth to be explored in future research.
Finally, my model does not allow for strategic interaction of countries and, thus, for plausible
retaliation actions. This is because my main interest are the welfare consequences of a trade
agreement for a country that trades multilaterally and may employ diﬀerent instruments of
trade policy. In this respect, I follow a long tradition in the literature of piecemeal tariﬀ
reform of which regional agreements are just a special kind. This paper shares with this
literature also the limit of analyzing only the two polar situations of trade policy: either
tariﬀ or non-tariﬀ protection, whereas a framework comprising these instruments together
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remains in the research agenda. Clearly, the quota case is useful to understand the eﬀects of
RTAs in presence of non-linear tariﬀs, also deﬁned as a system of tariﬀ-quotas.42
In spite of this limitation, the model correctly predicts that bilateral agreement entailing
tariﬀ-reductions can lead to terms of trade eﬀects consistently with empirical ﬁndings. More
interestingly, given the empirical relevance of VERs, it shows that such eﬀects can also be led
by bilateral agreements calling for the elimination of formerly negotiated VERs. Although,
t h ev o l u m ep r e s e r v a t i o no u t c o m ei sas p e c i ﬁcity of country-speciﬁcq u o t a sn o ts h a r e db y
VERs, the possibility that a welfare improvement will also be the outcome of such agreements
abolishing VERs is not compromised.
42Alternatively deﬁned also as tariﬀ- r a t eq u o t a s .T h et a r i ﬀ rate is low under an volume-threshold of imports
(on the in-quota quantities), while it is much higher above this threshold (on the out-of-quota quantities).
For example, imported car entering under the tariﬀ-quota (up to x cars) are generally charged 10%. Imports
entering outside the tariﬀ-quota are charged 80%.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A - Derivation of formula (13)
In general terms, suppose country A undertakes a piecemeal tariﬀ reform such as for example
a regional integration agreement. Let me index by 0 the level of a variable in the pre-reform
equilibrium and by 1 the level of a variable in the post-reform equilibrium. The budget
constraint of country A in the pre-reform and in the post-reform are the following:
p(0)Cx(0) + Cy(0) ≤ p(0)Qx(0) + Qy(0) + R(0) (20)
p(1)Cx(1) + Cy(1) ≤ p(1)Qx(1) + Qy(1) + TR(1) (21)
where R(0) is the tariﬀ revenue (quotarents) inunits of the local export good(y) collected
in the pre-reform equilibrium and TR(1) are the total transfers in units of the local export
good received in the post-reform equilibrium. The representative consumer of this economy
is better oﬀ after the implementation of the reform if her utility is at least as high as before
the reform. By the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WA), it is enough to show that the
old consumption and production bundle are still feasible and aﬀordable in the post-reform
equilibrium. Of course, if the transfer compensates the representative consumer in such a
way that the old consumption-production bundle is still aﬀordable in the new equilibrium,
the WA will hold. Such transfer is the following:
TR(1) = [p(1) − p(0)][Cx(0) − Qx(0)] + R(0) = [p(1) − p(0)]M(0) + R(0) (22)
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where the consumer receives the old tariﬀ revenue and a subsidy to compensate her for
an eventual increase in the relative domestic price of the imported good. It is easy to check
that the old consumption-production bundle (Cx(0),C y(0),Q x(0),Q y(0)) is still aﬀordable
in the new equilibrium by substituting (22) and ((Cx(0),C y(0),Q x(0),Q y(0))) in (21):
p(1)Cx(0) + Cy(0) ≤ p(1)Qx(0) + Qy(0) + [p(1) − p(0)][Cx(0) − Qx(0)] + R(0)
⇔ p(0)Cx(0) + Cy(0) ≤ p(0)Qx(0) + Qy(0) + R(0)
which is always veriﬁed as it is (20). Therefore, the consumer is better oﬀ.O n l yi ti sl e f t
t op r o v ei st h a tt r a n s f e rc a nb ea c t u a l l yﬁnanced with the new tariﬀ revenue, so that


















































Note that ti can also be the implicit tariﬀ associated to an import restriction mi.T h e
ﬁrst equality uses (11) and (22), the second equality uses (10) and p =( 1+ti)pwi and the
third equality is just rearranging terms. (23) is exactly (13) where the index 0 is the initial
equilibrium s and the index 1 is the post-agreement equilibrium q. Provided (23) holds,
the consumer is better oﬀ after the reform is implemented and the government budget is
balanced.
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A similar formula to (23) can also be derived for foreign country i undertaking a similar
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will make the old consumption-production bundle aﬀordable and therefore the consumer
















∗i(0)] ≥ 0 (24)
Whenever the last condition holds, foreign country i will be undoubtedly better oﬀ fol-
lowing the implementation of the reform.
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7.2 Appendix B - Proof of terms of trade preservation under re-
form q
I shall prove that pwB
q = pwB
s .
(8), (10), (9) and E(p,T)=
P
i∈{B,C}
M∗i(p∗i,p wi) (market y clearing condition) have to














The market x clearing condition (10) implies the following







s = M(ps,T s) − m
B
s ⇔ (26)





q ) − m
B
s = k
The market y clearing condition above together implies that:





s )=E(pq,T q) − M
∗B(p
wB
q ) ⇔ (27)
E(pq,T q) − E(ps,T s)=M
∗B(p
wB
q ) − m
∗B
s = H
Using (25), (27) in (8), it follows
m
∗B


























where the second line uses (8) again for equilibrium s. Indeed, when pwB
s = pwB
q ,t h e n
H = pwB
s k which is reciprocity!
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7.3 Appendix C - Reform v reduces e pCand has ambiguous eﬀects
on e pB
Is h a l lp r o v ee pC
v ≤ e pC
o . Recall (8) and (14) to (17) have to hold.
In particular, the assumption of a binding VER (mC
s ) even after the reform v is imple-
mented together with (8) imply:
M∗C(p∗C














v , e pC
v )=kM∗C(p∗C
o , e pC
o )
e pC
v = ke pC
o
∀k ≥ 0
Moreover, reform v changes relative domestic prices lowering relative domestic prices at
home because the economic value associated to the artiﬁcial scarcity created by a VER is
reduced after the reform is implemented. Therefore,
e p
C
v = pv ≤ po = e p
C
o ⇒ 0 ≤ k ≤ 1
where the equalities between A’s relative domestic price and A’s bilateral terms of trade
with C follows from the fact that A is not restraining its exports of good y to C. Therefore,
the price an exporter receives at home (py) is exactly the price received internationally as
paid by the importer (p∗C
y ).
Is h a l ls k e t c hap r o o ff o re pB
v R?e pB
o .
By (8), e pB
o = m∗B
s /mB
s .S i n c eb o t hV E R sa r ea s s u m e dt ob eb i n d i n g ,b o t hM∗B and E∗B
are greater in the new equilibrium. Depending on the relative magnitude of these changes,
the bilateral terms of trade with B may result appreciated or depreciated.
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7.4 Appendix D - Derivation of (18)
The logic and steps are identical to section 7.1 above. I shall use the same notation as well
with the understanding that all variables are now expressed in units of the local import good
(good x) at local prices.
Cx(0) + Cy(0)/p(0) ≤ Qx(0) + Qy(0)/p(0) + R(0)
Cx(1) + Cy(1)/p(1) ≤ Qx(1) + Qy(1)/p(1) + TR(1)














y (1) − Q
∗i
y (1)]
Adding and subtracting (
P
i[1/e pi(1) − 1/p(1)][C∗i
y (0) − Q∗i
y (0)])t oR(1) − TR(1) ≥ 0,
gives exactly (18) where M∗i(0) = C∗i
y (0) − Q∗i
y (0).
7.5 Appendix E - Proof of Proposition (2)
Recall A is a small country taking pwC, pwB as given and use the equilibrium result of section
(3.1). Under the assumptions of (a) a competitive trade model, (b) of quota license holder
operating in a competitive market, (c) of pwC ≤ pwB ≤ τC
I pwC and d) tariﬀ-equivalent
quota, i.e. mC
s = E∗C(p∗C
I ,p wC) with an implicit tariﬀ associated to it of τC
I , I need to show:
Vq − Vs ≥ Vt − VI
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where TI = pwC and mC
s = E∗C(p∗C
I ,p wC)=M(pI,p wC) since A only trades with C in
equilibrium Igiven that the price level and the income in the two trading equilibria are the
same, VI = V (pI,I(pI,p wC)) = V (ps,I(ps,p wC)=Vs.
Within the union, producer prices have to be equalized even after the agreement is
implemented. Thus,
pq = pt = p
wB ⇒ Qj(pq)=Qj(pt)=Qj(p
wB), j = x,y
and















where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that under quota protection A can still
i m p o r tf r o mt h el o w e s tc o s ts u p p l i e rC after the regional integration with B up to the
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limits imposed by the binding quota. The latter inequality is the direct consequence of
trade diversion arising in the tariﬀ case which causes the loss of all tariﬀ revenue after the
agreement with B is in place.
By the property of the indirect utility function that is strictly increasing in income, it
follows that
Vq = V (pq,I q)=V (p
wB,I(pq,T q)) > V ((p
wB,I(pt,p
wB)) = V (pt,I t)=Vt
This result holds true also when VER instead of volume quotas are in place. Terms of
trade are unchanged, domestic relative prices are identical to equilibrium q.T h u s ,po = ps =
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Vo = V (po,I o) ≤ V (pI,I I)=VI
as po = pI. It follows Vv − Vo ≥ Vt − VI.
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